Three Armies On The Somme

"Three Armies on the Somme, The First Battle of the Twentieth Century" by William Phillpott is an account of the WW1 Battle of the Somme, ostensibly from the point of view of each army, British, French, German, but from my reading the perspective is mostly on the British, some on the French, and a little on the German.

A well written, easy reading book, the author is earnestly trying to make his points.  I worry about books like this as I often fear the "evidence" is twisted somewhat in the author's desire to make his point rather than write a fair history.  Not being as well-read on the First World War as I would like to be, I do feel that Phillpott presents a fair perspective.  I also feel his thesis needs more proof.

His thesis, as the title states, is that the Battle of the Somme deserves the moniker of the "the first battle of the twentieth century."  "Battle" in the twentieth century was to be largely attritional engagements by large armies over vast territories and time rather than the 19th and earlier centuries drive for a decisive single battle by single armies at a definable point in time and space.  The Somme deserves this moniker because the Allied generals fighting the battle used, or at least attempted to use, tactics that recognized the new attritional paradigm rather than blindly and vainly seeking decisive breakthroughs in every battle plan.

I highlighted several sections of the book.

Page 124, Planning the Attritional Battle, has this gem, "The British plan was the product of two minds, certainly with different conceptions of the nature of industrial battle, often competing over details, one thinking strategically, the other tactically.  As yet the link between these two levels of war--what modern armed forces define as the "operational level of war"--was embryonic."

Page 151, Preparing the Big Push, on the nature of the tactical war; "Once its objectives were seized, the infantry would need sufficient firepower and cohesion to keep the enemy's counter-attacks at bay until reinforced.  The artillery could assist . . . .but in practice the infantry had to be able to defend themselves until the new position could be consolidated.  The keys to holding . . .remained reorganisation, reinforcement and resupply, digging in and wiring. . . . In effect the whole line would lurch a few hundred metres forward, stop, consolidate, report back, rethink and then start all over again. . . Whatever the hopes of over-optimistic military planners . . . it would not be hurried."


The connection between these two passages is that if the basic tactics could be more commonly executed and executed rapidly as a concentration in both time (temporal concentration) and space (spatial concentration), then the offensive action (including counter-offensive) could be expanded into a sustained war winning effort.

The author seeing this link between tactics and strategy I thought was excellent.  It is certainly evident in some of the planning and expectations.  Phillpott wants the rational use of operational art, not named as such at the time, to be the feature that gives the Somme Battle its modern characteristics, that creates a turning point in twentieth century warfare.  Myself, I see the battle as lacking in systematic operational planning given the new perspective by the leaders and very badly buggered in execution.  As such it should place the use of "operational art" on a very slow learning curve rather than a more definitive turning point.  "Operational Art" would evolve more rapidly and coherently after the war, in my opinion, and I would give most credit to the Soviets.  The British would continue to be reluctant adapters of modern war, and as point of fact, I would say Montgomery led the British in WWII as their leader in operational art.

And Philpott does argue, counter to his thesis in my opinion, that even if more could have been done to take advantage of the 'operational level,' the efforts would have faltered on the very real limits imposed by early twentieth century technology such as almost useless wireless transmission, and the primitive nature of the gasoline engine to provide the needed tactical mobility.  Which is what keeps the Battle of the Somme on the plane of the other bloody, seemingly pointless, WW1 battles rather than elevating it to a higher plane.

For the WW1 wargamer, you do have a lot of sketches of battalion and brigade level fights.  Detailed maps and photographs are very good.

Panzers in Winter

"Panzers in Winter" is S. Mitcham's history of the Battle of the Bulge in WWII.  The book is concise, sticks to a chronological format, provides adequate maps, and like I have found with Mitcham's other works, a good writing style.

For the most part, it is a re-telling of a well known story.  The book does provide a chapter that focuses on the difficult but successful effort by the Germans to surround the the green US 106th division with nearly tank-less, foot-mobile only infantry forces. 


Good book for the wargamer.  Mitcham sketches out several battles that are playable with various rules sets.

The Longest Battle

"The Longest Battle" by Harry Yeide covers the fighting on the approaches to the Roer River in 1944 and the crossings in 1945.  The book provides a detailed operational analysis of the Corps and Divisions and their various battlegroups that took part in the battles.  Well researched and a smooth read.  An appendix provides an order of battle for most of the divisions in the battle, though some divisions are ommitted from the orbat.  And the loan of British "Crocodiles" to the adjacent American formations is not noted in the orbat.  That nugget of information is on page 155 as a reference.  Maps are basic sketches though they are provided often enough in the text to keep the reader up to date with movements.

Interesting aspects of the fighting gleaned from the book are the relatively  heavy use of artillery by Germans and the methodical, grinding "bite and hold" methods of the Americans.  German artillery was more heavily concentrated than typical as guns were numerous and ammunition was plentiful as long as poor weather limited Allied airpower and the artillery regiments remained in the fight as their grenadier and panzer regiments were pulled from the fight to refit. 
The Americans had a mixture of veteran and new divisions in the fight as well as a new Army, the Ninth.  Not in a great hurry to cross the Roer, which the Americans assumed would be flooded and strand their bridgeheads,  a methodical approach to combat predominated.  The Ninth Army in particular would advance forward with artillery fire, smoke, and airpower at a maximum and operate in depth to contain the inevitable German counter-attack.  More veteran divisions such as the 2nd Armored or 29th Infantry would make bolder advances but all in all it was an attritional contest with the advantage to the Allies.

An interesting companion piece to Yeide's book is Tieke's book on the II SS Panzerkorps.  The II SS Panzerkorps contained the 10SS Panzer Division which fought in November and December to defend the Roer River crossings at Linnich.  By way of highlighting the German artillery concentrations, the 10SS fought with not only their own artillery regiment, but with support from the artillery regiments of the 9th Panzer and 15 Panzergrenadier divisions that had been pulled out of the line.

A good book for wargamers as lots of scenarios can be pulled from the book.  Given the absence of grand sweeping maneuvers and the predominance of slugging contests, each day of battle could provide game scenarios for many different rules sets.